Working Papers
Formal working papers on strategic systems, computational institutions and the ethics of technology.
A programme of analytically self-contained working papers in computational social science, game theory, decision theory, digital health ethics, AI governance, institutional behaviour and collective decision-making. Each paper constructs an explicit analytical framework, formalises its principal mechanisms and identifies its empirical, ethical or institutional limitations. The programme combines positive analysis of incentives and belief formation with normative inquiry into the design of accountable computational institutions.
Digital Health Ethics & AI Governance
Game theory, decision theory and data architecture applied to healthcare AI, telemedicine, human oversight and the governance of sensitive information.
Political Systems Analysis
Coalition theory, veto players and adversarial strategy applied to the architecture of political decision-making.
- 01
The “Anti-Maranza” Bill: Security as Electoral Technology
A Game-Theoretical Model of Punitive Signalling, Moral Panic and the Political Production of ObedienceA game-theoretical analysis of Italy's “anti-maranza” bill as punitive signalling, electoral reassurance and a political technology of social control.
JEL D72JEL D78JEL K42JEL H11JEL C7213 August 2026Research Article — Version 1.016 min read - 02
The Wide Coalition as an Adversarial Decision System
A Game-Theoretic Failure Analysis of Italy's Campo LargoA formal game-theoretic analysis of coalition instability, adversarial issue selection and decision-system compatibility within Italy's prospective broad progressive alliance.
JEL C71JEL C72JEL D71JEL D72JEL D744 August 2026Working Paper — Version 1.045 min read - 03
Scarcity, Relative Payoffs and Political Irrationality
A Game-Theoretic Reading of the 2026 Saxony-Anhalt ElectionA formal game-theoretic analysis of political behaviour under persistent scarcity, examining how relative payoffs, welfare retrenchment, out-group exclusion, overconfidence and distorted beliefs can make materially disadvantageous political choices subjectively optimal. Using expected-utility models, Bayesian belief distortion, quantal response, regret measures, repeated games and a computational simulation, the paper distinguishes instrumental consistency from epistemic and substantive rationality.
JEL C72JEL D72JEL D81JEL D83JEL D90JEL H539 September 2026Working Paper — Version 1.028 min read
Applied Game Theory
Bayesian games, signalling and electoral competition applied to institutional episodes.
The research programme distinguishes between positive and normative analysis. Some papers model strategic incentives, institutional behaviour and belief formation without deriving moral conclusions from strategic effectiveness. Others examine the normative design of computational institutions, particularly where technology affects autonomy, health, privacy, equity and public responsibility. Each paper explicitly identifies its analytical standpoint, assumptions and limitations.